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AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY:
DRAWING ON INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
PROMOTE PROGRESS
J. Janewa Osei-Tutu*
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 531
ABSTRACT
In Bowman v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court declined to apply the
principle of exhaustion to limit the patentee’s ability to control the
reproduction of self-replicating inventions. This decision was
justified from a patent law perspective on the basis that a patent
holder has a right to prevent others from making the invention. But
what happens when we take other perspectives into account? For
instance, a farmer might have human rights or other rights that may
need to be balanced against the patentee’s right. Since globalized
intellectual property standards were established through
international agreements and much of the resistance to intellectual
property laws is taking place at the international level, this Article
turns to international law for guidance. Taking into consideration
the competing regimes that touch on intellectual property rights, this
Article concludes that we must continue to look for solutions within
intellectual property law itself.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowman v.
Monsanto, in which it concluded that patent law protects Monsanto’s
ability to control reproduction of its patented seed technology, even
after the seed has been sold and used for planting by the farmer. But
what happens when there are significant competing social
considerations at stake? Although the topic of genetically modified
food crops raises issues regarding intellectual property laws and
biodiversity, this Article does not seek to address whether
intellectual property laws have a positive or negative impact on crop
biodiversity.1 Rather, the narrow focus of this Article is on the utility
of “counter-regimes” in addressing concerns generated by the
patenting of genetically modified foods.
This Article argues that it is helpful to look to international law
for solutions, particularly since globalized intellectual property
standards were established through international agreements.
Furthermore, much of the resistance to harmonized intellectual
property standards is taking place at the international level.
Ultimately, however, even if domestic courts were to take
international law into account, there are no clear legal obligations
that would have led to a different result. Part of that is due to the fact
that the Monsanto cases do not present strong human rights claims.
In addition, the other regimes are relatively weak as compared to the
global intellectual property framework. While we can be guided by
the various international instruments on intellectual property and the
instruments on agricultural biodiversity, some part of the solution to
the issues raised by the patenting of agricultural biotechnologies
must come from within intellectual property law itself.
Part I will discuss the Monsanto cases from the United States
and Canada as well as some of the reasons that we might be inclined
to treat agricultural biotechnology differently from other kinds of
technology. Part II will turn to the different international instruments
that could be used to address some of the concerns regarding
agricultural biotechnology.

1. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional
Wisdom on the Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10625, 10626-27 (2001) (characterizing both sides of the debate
between intellectual property and biodiversity as flawed).
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I. MONSANTO SUPREME COURT CASES
A. United States and Canada
To what extent can the patentee control the use of subsequent
generations of genetically modified seed? Although the facts were
different, both the United States Supreme Court and the Canadian
Supreme Court have confronted this issue in the past decade. The
Canadian Supreme Court decision regarding Monsanto canola dates
back to the 2002 case of Monsanto v. Schmeiser. The United States
Supreme Court case, Bowman v. Monsanto, regarding Monsanto
soybeans was issued approximately a decade later. The Bowman
decision will be the primary focus of the discussion here, although
the Schmeiser case will also be addressed.
Monsanto sells genetically modified soybean seeds to farmers
under specific conditions. The soybean seeds are glyphosate
resistant, which means that they will withstand the Roundup Ready
herbicide when it is applied to them.2 The genetic modification that
allows the seed to survive the application of the herbicide is passed
down from one generation of seed to the next.3 When the farmer
purchases the seeds, she agrees to use the seeds for only one year,
but she cannot reuse the seeds for planting or sell the seeds to
another person for planting.4 However, the farmer can consume the
harvested soybeans or sell them to grain elevators, which then sell
them for human or animal consumption.5
Mr. Bowman was a farmer based in Indiana. He purchased seed
from Monsanto and complied with the contract the first year he
purchased the seed. The following season, however, Mr. Bowman
decided to purchase commodity seed from a grain elevator. This
seed, which came from the harvest of other local farmers, was
intended for human or animal consumption, but Mr. Bowman
decided to plant it.6 When he sprayed the Roundup Ready herbicide
on the plants, many of them survived because they contained the
glyphosate-resistant gene. Mr. Bowman then saved the seed from the
crop that survived for replanting the following year. Each year, he

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
Id. at 1764-65.
Id. at 1764.
Id.
Id. at 1765.
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repeated the same practice, sometimes adding soybean seeds
purchased from the grain elevator.7
Monsanto sued Bowman for violating its patent by reproducing
the seed without permission.8 The patentee has the exclusive right to
make the patented article.9 Bowman argued that Monsanto’s patent
rights had been exhausted once the seed was sold.10 The doctrine of
exhaustion provides that the patentee cannot control what happens
with the patented article after the item has been sold. However, this
does not give the purchaser of a patented invention the right to make
new copies of the item.11
Bowman may not have been the most sympathetic plaintiff
because he appears to have taken deliberate measures to avoid
paying Monsanto for the glyphosate-resistant seed on an annual
basis.12 However, one cannot judge the farmer too harshly given that
the case presented the complex issue of how to treat self-replicating
technologies. If the Court had accepted Bowman’s argument that the
patent right had been exhausted with the sale of the seed, his actions
would have been perfectly legal. Moreover, as some interveners in
this case have pointed out, even farmers who do not want to use
Monsanto’s genetically modified seeds may have their crops
unintentionally mixed with the Monsanto product.13 Such farmers
may also be infringing the Monsanto patent. In response to such
concerns, Monsanto has promised that it will not litigate against
7. Id. (“Bowman saved seed from that crop to use in his late-season
planting the next year—and then the next, and the next, until he had harvested eight
crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted saved seed from the year before
(sometimes adding more soybeans bought from the grain elevator), sprayed his
fields with glyphosate to kill weeds (and any non-resistant plants), and produced a
new crop of glyphosate-resistant—i.e., Roundup Ready—soybeans.”).
8. Id.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of
the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention
is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by
that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.”).
10. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765.
11. Id. at 1766.
12. Id. at 1769.
13. Brief of the Public Patent Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796) (arguing that the Federal
Circuit decision would make farmers whose seeds were inadvertently contaminated
infringers).
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innocent infringers.14 Other companies have made similar “patent
pledges” or promises that they will not enforce their patent rights in
certain instances.15 However, this can provide the user only limited
comfort because, while users might be able to make an estoppel
argument, the patentee may be well within its right to sue.16
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Canada case illustrates,
even when it is not entirely clear how the farmer obtained the
Monsanto seed, the courts may nonetheless favor the patentee. In
2004, the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to decide
what should happen when a farmer’s seeds are mixed with
genetically modified Monsanto seeds without the clear, deliberate
actions seen in Bowman. In the Canadian case, Schmeiser v.
Monsanto,17 the plaintiff arguably had a more compelling case than
Mr. Bowman. Nonetheless, Monsanto prevailed in the dispute.18
Percy Schmeiser was a commercial farmer in Saskatchewan.19
Although he had not purchased the Monsanto glyphosate-resistant
seeds, tests revealed that his 1998 canola crop was comprised of
more than 95% Monsanto genetically modified canola. It was
unclear how Schmeiser ended up with the genetically modified
canola.20 A number of farmers near him had purchased the Monsanto
product.21 By 2000, nearly 40% of all canola grown in Canada was
Monsanto glyphosate-resistant canola, so it was possible that his
crops were inadvertently contaminated by Monsanto seed.22
However, the majority of the Court expressed the view that
Schmeiser was not an innocent infringer because he had actively
14. See Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“It has never been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise
its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seed or traits are present in
farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means.”).
15. See, e.g., Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, http://www.
google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); see also Dennis
Crouch, Tesla Motors and the Rise of Non-ICT Patent Pledges, PATENTLY-O (June
16, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/motors-patent-pledges.html.
16. It has been suggested, however, that a “market reliance” theory could
make such pledges legally enforceable. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance
Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming).
17. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
18. Id. ¶ 97.
19. Id. ¶ 4.
20. Id. ¶ 6.
21. Id. ¶ 5.
22. Id. ¶ 10.
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collected and planted canola seeds that had survived the application
of the Roundup Ready pesticide.23 The Court did not reach a
conclusion on whether Schmeiser had “made” the patented gene
contrary to Canadian patent law.24 However, the Court concluded
that he had “used” the patented gene for commercial purposes, which
amounted to an infringing use.25
Whether one agrees with these Monsanto decisions or not, the
patent law analyses in both the United States and Canadian cases are
supportable. Though it has been argued that the United States
Supreme Court created an exception to patent exhaustion,26 the Court
reasoned that the farmer made a new invention by reproducing the
genetically modified soybean seed without Monsanto’s permission.27
The Supreme Court refused to treat self-replicating technologies as
distinct from other technologies and rejected what it called the
“blame-the-bean defense” because Bowman was not a passive
observer.28 Nonetheless, the Court left open the possibility that the
result might have been different if Bowman had not taken deliberate
steps to reproduce the glyphosate-resistant seed. The Court also
stated that its decision was limited to the particular facts of this case
and is not applicable to every case involving a self-replicating
organism.29
23. Id. ¶¶ 6, 28, 72.
24. Id. ¶¶ 26-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. ¶¶ 69, 72.
26. Shubha Ghosh has said:
In its decision finding for Monsanto, the Federal Circuit creates an
exception to the patent exhaustion doctrine for the sui-generis category of
self-replicating technologies. The court repeated its reasoning in Monsanto
v Scruggs that “[a]pplying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations
of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the patent
holder.” Effectively, the court has created an exception from the patent
exhaustion doctrine for self-replicating technologies, meaning inventions
that recreate themselves through reproduction.
SHUBHA GHOSH, INT’L ASSOC. OF LAWYERS, INNOVATION, HEALTH AND THE RIGHT
TO KNOW: THE LAW OF FOOD, FIBER AND TOXINS, PATENTS, GMO’S, AND PROGRESS
4 (2014), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=
web&cd=2&ved=0CCkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uianet.org%2Fsites%2
Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fsafe_uploads%2Fclients%2F39144%2Frapports%2FGHOSH
%2520SHUBHA%2520-%2520Innovation%2520Health%2520and%2520the%2520
Right%2520to%2520Know%2520140904.pdf&ei=lU-WVI7UBoqYNpbTgdAP&
usg=AFQjCNFTQ8GcKP2Pz0Hc3RXJbeA4CZuDjw&sig2=50_NdQzOxtFvbul6fx3jw.
27. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct.1761, 1765-66 (2013).
28. Id. at 1768-69.
29. Id. at 1769.
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Similarly, in the Schmeiser case, the Supreme Court of Canada
emphasized that it was not addressing innocent infringers or any
moral questions that may arise regarding agricultural
biotechnologies.30 The Supreme Court of Canada noted that
agricultural inventions “may give rise to concerns not raised in other
fields—moral concerns about whether it is right to manipulate genes
in order to obtain better weed control or higher yields. It is open to
Parliament to consider these concerns and amend the Patent Act
should it find them persuasive.”31
The question that follows is whether patent rights should be
exhausted or otherwise limited when the technology concerns live,
self-replicating organisms.32 This is distinct from the questions
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Bowman33 and the
Canadian Supreme Court in Schmeiser.34 In Bowman, for instance,
the United States Supreme Court expressed concern that the soybean
seed could be reproduced an infinite number of times and that the
patentee would not receive the benefit of the invention.35 The courts
were focused on the benefit of the patent to which the patentee is
entitled. Patent laws can help stimulate innovation, at least in
industrialized countries.36 Accepting that innovators require some
protection for their innovation, the next section of this Article will
discuss whether there is something special about genetically
modified self-replicating technologies that should distinguish them
from other types of patented inventions.

30. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902, ¶ 2 (“[W]e emphasize from the outset
that we are not concerned here with the innocent discovery by farmers of ‘blow-by’
patented plants on their land or in their cultivated fields. Nor are we concerned with
the scope of the respondents’ patent or the wisdom and social utility of the genetic
modification of genes and cells—a practice authorized by Parliament under the
Patent Act and its regulations.”).
31. Id. ¶ 93.
32. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769.
33. “The question in this case is whether a farmer who buys patented seeds
may reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s
permission. We hold that he may not.” Id. at 1764.
34. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902, ¶¶ 1-2.
35. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766-67.
36. Brent B. Allred & Walter G. Park, Patent Rights and Innovative
Activity: Evidence from National and Firm-Level Data, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 878,
879-82 (2007).
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B. Do Agricultural Technologies Present Unique Concerns?
Different kinds of technologies may have a distinct impact on
the users of the technology. In particular, patenting life forms and
self-replicating organisms raises issues that are far more complex
than anyone might have imagined when the first patent laws were
enacted. Despite the fact that the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
famously concluded that “anything under the sun that is made by
man” is patentable,37 patenting genes raises issues that are distinct
from patenting machines. Patents relating to coffee lids, pens, or
lawn mowers do not present the same difficulties as patents over
self-replicating technologies like seeds or mice. Thus, while patent
law may not distinguish between the different technologies, the
effects of patents are felt more strongly in some areas of technology
than others. This is not the same as resisting technology due to
concern about a “parade of horribles,”38 but rather, it is about
recognizing that not all technologies present the same moral or
ethical issues that may arise with technologies regarding plant,
animal, or human genes.
This Article does not seek to engage in the debate about
whether or not agricultural biotechnologies should be patented. But
perhaps an argument can be made that there is something special
about food or farming that warrants more than a narrow economic
analysis of the interests of the patentee.39 Indeed, as James Chen
37. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 316-17 (“The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles.
Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research
may pose a serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are
far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this time. We are told
that genetic research and related technological developments may spread pollution
and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may
tend to depreciate the value of human life. . . . It is argued that this Court should
weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent’s invention is
patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree.”).
39. Saby Ghoshray, Food Safety and Security in the Monsanto Era: Peering
Through the Lens of a Rights Paradigm Against an Onslaught of Corporate
Domination, 65 ME. L. REV. 491, 492 (2013) (“Since our earliest ancestors’ desire
for a better hunting weapon to procure food or a better storage facility to avoid
spoilage, food safety and security has shaped human social and technological
evolution like no other essential element. The need to procure food has shaped our
civilization since the first human graced our planet. Food continues to be a pivotal
force in humankind’s saga of life and death. Yet, despite stratospheric progress in
scientific application surrounding food, food security and safety for all citizens
continues to elude mankind.”).
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explains, “‘[c]opying’—often a deviant and difficult deed for wouldbe infringers of intellectual property in many other industries—is the
very essence of agriculture. Whether cultivating plants or raising
animals, farmers specialize in plying reproductive techniques and
technology.”40 If copying is the essence of what farmers do, then
there is arguably some inherent tension between traditional farming
practices and patenting self-replicating food crops.
This dialogue is about more than a particular company or
product. It is about the future of food security at a time when food
products are increasingly modified and possibly protected by
intellectual property rights.41 Intellectual property law has been
confronted with concerns about access to knowledge and access to
medicines.42 What do intellectual property rights in genetically
modified seeds or crops mean for access to food, if anything? There
is some risk that agricultural biotechnology will create a dependency
on IP-protected technologies over time, particularly as traditional
farming practices and local knowledge are increasingly displaced by
large-scale commercial food production.43 In the United States and
Canadian context, it is the individual farmer pitted against the large
agribusiness. In the broader global context, this becomes a question
about the impact of intellectual property rights on the poor.
In isolation, patent law cannot provide satisfactory answers to
complex issues of morality and the appropriate boundaries regarding
intellectual property interests over seeds, plants, and animals. The
Supreme Court clearly tells us that the patent right in the genetically
40. See Chen, supra note 1, at 10636 (arguing that Global South cannot
criticize biotechnology industries of bio-piracy while supporting farmer’s rights
because farming practices are based on similar free-riding practices).
41. H. Charles J. Godfray et al., Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9
Billion People, 327 SCI. 812, 812-15 (2010).
42. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (adopted Nov.
14, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.htm.
43. Chidi Oguamanam, Agro-Biodiversity and Food Security:
Biotechnology and Traditional Agricultural Practices at the Periphery of
International Intellectual Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 215,
244-45 (2007); see also Keith Aoki, “Free Seeds, Not Free Beer”: Participatory
Plant Breeding, Open Source Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in
Agriculture, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2275 (2009) (“[T]he rise and expansion of
intellectual property rights in plants and varieties during the twentieth century has
significantly reduced the role of farmers in plant breeding, turning them into
consumers providing labor to raise crops in which others hold the underlying
intellectual property rights.”).
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modified seed was not exhausted and that a new invention is made
when new genetically modified seeds are planted and grown.44 This
answer, while perhaps acceptable from a patent law perspective, may
be inadequate from a human rights, international-development, or
biodiversity perspective. The next Part turns to a discussion of the
primary international agreements that address patent rights.
II. TURNING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Monsanto is a global corporation. Intellectual property law,
although it is domestic law, is also international law. Neither the
World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) nor any of the international
agreements discussed here are directly applicable to the dispute in
Monsanto v. Bowman. However, harmonized intellectual property
standards were developed at the international level and much of the
resistance to intellectual property rights has been in international
fora.45 Thus, international law, while not a source of controlling law,
is relevant to the broader discussion of intellectual property rights
and agricultural biotechnology products. This Part will discuss the
international laws that protect patent rights as well as the regimes
that one can draw on as a counter to patent law.
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
(Paris Convention) is the earliest international agreement relating to
patents.46 The Paris Convention specifies that the protection of
industrial property includes patents, among other things.47 This
agreement requires national treatment for parties to the agreement. It
also establishes various other requirements, such as the right of the
inventor to be named, the right of priority for patent filings in
different countries, and the independence of patents in different
countries.48 According to the Paris Convention, “industrial property”
is to be understood in its broadest sense so that it is not limited to
44. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766-67 (2013).
45. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration
of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 748-49 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
46. See Paris Convention, supra note 45, at 1585.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1586, 1589-90.
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industry and commerce but also includes “agricultural and . . .
natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle,
minerals, mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.”49 Thus, patents
relating to agricultural products find support in the Paris Convention.
TRIPS builds on the Paris Convention.50 TRIPS established a
minimum twenty-year term of protection for patents in all World
Trade Organization (WTO) member countries.51 The TRIPS
obligations apply to governments and not to private individuals.
However, the TRIPS Agreement has been adopted by WTO member
states, and the provisions have been implemented into national law.52
Thus, the national laws of WTO members, like the United States and
Canada, should be consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.53
Article 27 of TRIPS addresses patentable subject matter.54
TRIPS Article 27.1 requires patent protection to be available for all
fields of technology.55 Thus, subject to exceptions, WTO members
cannot categorically exclude agricultural biotechnology products, or
even more specifically, seeds, from patent protection. The language
of TRIPS appears to be stronger than that of the Paris Convention,
which specifically acknowledges agricultural patents but does not
mandate patent protection for all fields of technology.
Importantly, however, the obligation in TRIPS that patents
must be available for all fields of technology is subject to two
49. Id. at 1585.
50. TRIPS incorporates parts of the Paris Convention and provides that
nothing in TRIPS shall derogate from rights under the Paris Convention. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 45, at 301.
51. See id. at 314. Article 33 states, “[t]he term of protection available shall
not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing
date.” Id.
52. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155 (“The agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Multilateral
Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.”).
53. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 45, at 301 (“Members shall give
effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
practice.”).
54. Id. at 311.
55. Id. (“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.”).
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specific exceptions.56 First, pursuant to Article 27.2 of TRIPS, WTO
members can exclude inventions where it is necessary to do so in
order to protect public order or morality. This provision allows
exclusions to patent protection to “protect human, animal or plant
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”57
Secondly, under Article 27.3, WTO members can exclude diagnostic
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals, and
pursuant to Article 27.3(b), “plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes.”58 Article 27.3(b) also requires that WTO members protect
plant varieties through patent law or a sui generis regime.
Thus, Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS provides some flexibility for
WTO member nations to exclude plants, and possibly biological
material relating to plants, from patentability. This provision has
been the subject of much discussion, particularly with respect to
traditional knowledge and biodiversity. The TRIPS Agreement
required a review of Article 27.3(b), which deals with patentability
or non-patentability of plant and animal inventions, and the
protection of plant varieties.59 In addition, the public order and
morality clause, for instance, reflects an acknowledgement within
TRIPS that there may be legitimate reasons outside of patent law for
refusing to patent certain kinds of inventions.60
In addition to TRIPS Article 27, the Doha Declaration played
an important role in shaping the conversation regarding intellectual
property and biodiversity at the WTO.61 The Declaration directed the
Council for TRIPS to study the relationship between TRIPS, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the protection of
traditional knowledge and folklore.62 The Council’s work on these
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 312.
59. Id. The final sentence reads, “[t]he provisions of this subparagraph shall
be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.” Id.
60. It may be very difficult for WTO Members to rely on this provision as a
basis for opting out of their TRIPS obligations. Public order and morality are
nebulous concepts, but more importantly, member states would have to demonstrate
necessity.
61. Doha Declaration, supra note 45.
62. Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration states:
We instruct the Council for TRIPS, in pursuing its work programme
including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work
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topics was to be guided by the objectives and principles of TRIPS,
which are found in Articles 7 and 8, respectively, and to take
development issues fully into account. The 2006 WTO report that
was generated as a result concluded that TRIPS and CBD are not
inconsistent but that further study is required.63 Thus, while the Doha
Declaration reflects a desire to protect the interests of both producers
and users of intellectual property-protected goods related to
agricultural products, the Article 27.3(b) review does not help to
answer the question of the exhaustion of self-replicating
technologies. This is because the focus has been on disclosure of
genetic resources, protection of traditional knowledge, and benefit
sharing.64
Another TRIPS provision that one might draw on is TRIPS
Article 7, which speaks to the goal of intellectual property protection
as promoting innovation and technology transfer “to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance
of rights and obligations.”65 Article 8 of TRIPS gives WTO members
the flexibility to take measures to protect public health and nutrition,
provided that the measures are consistent with the TRIPS
obligations.66 There was no legitimate health or nutrition purpose
raised by the plaintiffs in either the Bowman or Schmeiser cases, so
Article 8 would not have any bearing on the analysis of those cases.
Health concerns related to the genetically modified Monsanto seed
foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12 of this declaration, to examine, inter
alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention
on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and
folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by members
pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS Council
shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8
of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development
dimension.
Id. at 749.
63. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Note by the Secretariat: The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity: Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made,
IP/C/W368/Rev.1 (Feb. 8, 2006).
64. Id. at 5.
65. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 45, at 303.
66. TRIPS, Article 8.1 states, “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” Id.
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and the Roundup Ready pesticide could, however, be raised by
farmers who wanted to avoid the Monsanto product but had their
crops inadvertently contaminated. This was not the case in either
Bowman or Schmeiser.
Article 7, however, is relevant insofar as it indicates that
intellectual property protection and enforcement should be to the
advantage of users as well as producers. As a user, Bowman argued
that the patent rights in the seed had been exhausted after the first
sale.67 Article 6 of TRIPS explicitly recognizes the lack of
international agreement on the question of exhaustion of intellectual
property rights.68 While Article 6 of TRIPS specifically refers to
dispute settlement between countries, the principle that the
provisions of the Agreement should not be used to address the
question of exhaustion of rights is nonetheless pertinent. It was
possible to reach global agreement on many things, including
patentable subject matter and patent term, but there was no
agreement on exhaustion, so international law is not helpful in this
regard.69
Intellectual property protection is subject to exceptions. The
question TRIPS cannot answer is where society should draw the line
between protection that will stimulate innovation and the level of
protection that will stifle innovation or cause other harms. TRIPS
Article 30 recognizes exceptions to patent protection. However, the
exceptions must not “unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent” or “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties.”70
The TRIPS Agreement offers no clear solution. International
intellectual property agreements alone will not provide solutions to
the difficult questions regarding gene technologies and self67. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013).
68. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 45, at 303. Article 6 states, “[f]or the
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” Id.
69. This provision would be primarily about the applicability of national,
regional, or international exhaustion rather than determining when a particular test
for exhaustion has been met.
70. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 45, at 312-13 (“Members may
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
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replicating inventions. This is because, as Chidi Oguamanam argues,
TRIPS is driven by a “‘commodity logic,’” which aims to maximize
profits for intellectual property producers.71 Oguamanam contends:
This vision of intellectual property rights is mainly championed by
Western countries. It stands in conflict with a core objective of intellectual
property in terms of fostering innovation . . . and most important . . . , it
undermines an alternative vision of intellectual property, one that supports
the role of intellectual property in promoting public claims to knowledge
and other issues bordering on social justice or public interest.72

Critics of strong intellectual property rights for agricultural
products express concern for agro-biodiversity as well as the
increased risk of food insecurity, particularly for developing
countries.73 Rural communities in particular may be impacted
because most of the world’s poor live in rural areas.74 Agrobiodiversity, which is related to the promotion of food security, is
about sustaining the diversity of the agricultural ecosystem.75 Thus,
patenting seeds and other food-related technologies can present
human rights concerns.
The next section of this Article will discuss regimes outside of
intellectual property law that have different goals from TRIPS and
that provide alternative frameworks for analyzing the challenges
raised by intellectual property rights in agricultural biotechnologies.
Professor Oguamanam speaks of regimes and counter-regimes.76
These include international human rights law, the Convention on
Biological Diversity, and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources.

71. Chidi Oguamanam, Regime Tension in the Intellectual Property Rights
Arena: Farmer’s Rights and Post-TRIPS Counter Regime Trends, 29 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 413, 424 (2006) (quoting James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the
Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 261, 309 (2002)).
72. Id.
73. See Oguamanam, supra note 43, at 219.
74. “The United Nations Millennium Development Project’s Task Force on
Hunger has shown that 80 per cent of the world’s hungry live in rural areas.” Human
Rights Council, Requests Addressed to the Advisory Committee Stemming from
Human Rights Council Resolutions: Right to Food, A/HRC/AC/3/CRP.5 (Aug. 4,
2009).
75. See Oguamanam, supra note 43, at 220.
76. See Oguamanam, supra note 71, at 417.
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A. Counter-Regimes
Human rights law can serve as a counter-regime to intellectual
property law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
is the principal international source for human rights law. The
UDHR, together with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), comprise the
International Bill of Human Rights.77 The ICESCR is not legally
binding on the United States because it has not been ratified.78
However, the United States is a signatory to the ICESCR, and it has
ratified the ICCPR.79
Human rights arguments could be based, for instance, on the
right to food or the right to health. Article 25(1) of the UDHR
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care.”80 Article 11(1)
of the ICESCR similarly provides that everyone has the right “to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions.”81 Article 11(1) goes on to state
that the parties to the agreement will take steps to ensure that this
right is realized.82 Under Article 11(2), everyone has a fundamental

77. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO.2
(REV.1), THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf
(“The
International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional
Protocols.”)
78. The United States became a signatory to the ICESCR in 1977, but
unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United States has
not ratified the ICESCR. See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966)
[hereinafter
ICESCR],
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
79. Id.
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
81. ICESCR, supra note 78, at art. 11(1).
82. Id.
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right to be free from hunger.83 The right to food encompasses the
availability of food as well as the economic accessibility of food.84
Biotechnological innovation is not necessarily inconsistent with
the right to adequate food and could, in some instances, support the
availability of adequate food supplies.85 However, should farmers be
limited in their ability to produce crops because of patent rights, then
the patent protection for the agricultural biotechnology could be
inconsistent with the right to food. For instance, one of the
interveners pointed out that Monsanto controls more than 85% of all
soybean, corn, cotton, sugar beets, and canola grown in the United
States.86
The right to health is found in Article 25 of the UDHR87 and
Article 12 of the ICESCR, which recognizes “the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.”88 The right to health under human rights law is
broader than the right to health as defined by the World Health
Organization. Among other things, the right to health encompasses
the right to food.89 In addition, some critics have health concerns
83. Id. at art. 11(2).
84. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 12 on its
20th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
85. If the technology makes more food more easily available in terms of
quantity and cost, then it could be promoting the human right to food.
86. First Amended Complaint at 35, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n
v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 2163(NRB))
(“Monsanto dominates the market for transgenic seeds and traits. Monsanto
currently holds the largest percentage of the global proprietary seed market of any
company. In the United States, Monsanto’s control of the seed market is so high that
over 85-90% of all soybeans, corn, cotton, sugar beets and canola grown in the
United States contains Monsanto’s patented genes.”).
87. UDHR Article 25 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2)
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social
protection.
UDHR, supra note 80, at art. 25.
88. See ICESCR, supra note 78, at art. 12.
89. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 14 on its
22d Sess., Apr. 25-May 12, 2000, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
(“The right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the realization of other
human rights, as contained in the International Bill of Rights, including the rights to
food, housing, work, education, human dignity, life, non-discrimination, equality,

548

Michigan State Law Review

2015:531

regarding genetically modified seeds and the pesticide application
that is part of the Monsanto process.90
Another counter-regime can be found in the CBD. The primary
goal of the CBD is the protection of biodiversity.91 It also aims to
ensure prior informed consent for access to genetic resources and
benefit sharing for products derived from genetic resources and
technology transfer.92 It intersects with intellectual property law in
various ways. For instance, the CBD explicitly mentions and defines
biotechnology,93 and encourages technology transfer while
recognizing that these technologies may be protected by patents or
other intellectual property laws.94
The CBD also promotes protection for the practices of
traditional and local communities.95 These CBD provisions have
been the subject of study and discussion at the WTO and the World
Intellectual Property Organization.96 Article 8(j) of the CBD speaks
of preserving knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous
and local communities that embody traditional lifestyles and promote
biological diversity.97 In Article 16, the parties to the CBD undertake
the prohibition against torture, privacy, access to information, and the freedoms of
association, assembly and movement. These and other rights and freedoms address
integral components of the right to health.”).
90. First Amended Complaint at 39, Organic Seed Growers, 851 F. Supp.
2d 544 (No. 11 Civ. 2163(NRB)).
91. See Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD].
92. CBD Article 1 states:
The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its
relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of
relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources
and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.
Id.
93. CBD Article 2 defines “‘[b]iotechnology’” to mean “any technological
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to
make or modify products or processes for specific use.” Id. at art. 2. The word
“‘technology’” is also defined to include biotechnology. Id.
94. Id. at art. 16.
95. Id. at art. 8(j).
96. See generally Intergovernmental Comm. on Intellectual Prop. &
Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Disclosure of Origin or Source
of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications,
Eighth Sess., June 6-10, 2005, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11 (May 17, 2005).
97. See CBD, supra note 91, at art. 8(j).
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to facilitate technology transfer, including biotechnology, while
respecting intellectual property rights.98
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is an additional
resource for those seeking to protect the interests of farmers. The
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGR), which as developed at the FAO, has as its
objective the sustainable use of genetic resources and “fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use.”99 Article 9
of the ITPGR recognizes Farmer’s Rights.100 While the ITPGR
makes it clear that farmers have the right to save, use, and exchange
their seed, it is equally clear that this is subject to national law and
only “as appropriate.”101 Thus, while this treaty recognizes Farmer’s
Rights, the protection is relatively weak. Whatever rights farmers
have under the ITPGR are subject to national law, and even then,
farmers have only those rights deemed “appropriate” by states.
In contemplating whether Monsanto should be limited in its
ability to control self-replicating genetically modified seeds, we
should be guided not only by patent law, but also by principles from
international agreements that are concerned with human welfare and
human progress. These counter-regimes found in human rights
agreements, the CBD, and the ITPGR can serve as persuasive
counterweights to the economic focus of the agreements that protect
intellectual property. The challenge, from a legal perspective, is that
the existence of these counter-regimes does not alter any domestic or
international intellectual property regime. In other words, none of
these human rights or agricultural agreements has sufficient legal
effect to constrain patent law. This is largely due to the fact that
powerful countries like the United States have either not ratified the
agreements, or these agreements have taken the form of declarations
or guidelines.
Intellectual property laws are supposed to produce some social
benefit.102 Some part of the solution may lay in recasting the role of
98.
99.

Id. at art. 16.
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL TREATY
ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE art. 1.1 (2009)
[hereinafter ITPGR], available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf.
100. Id. at art. 9.
101. Id. at art. 9.3 (“Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to limit any
rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating
material, subject to national law and as appropriate.”).
102. CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES 5 (2d ed. 2010) (“The
argument that there are social benefits to be gained from the development and
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intellectual property in promoting “progress” as human progress
rather than primarily economic progress.103 Promoting human
progress is no more nebulous than “promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and [the] useful Arts,” to draw on language from the United
States Constitution.104
Human progress can take into account economic progress,
scientific and artistic progress, and the human development indices
that are used by the United Nations. There are indices to measure the
health of the population, literacy, educational attainment, life
expectancy, and a variety of factors that are indicative of quality of
life. The Human Development Index recognizes that economic
progress alone is not an adequate measure of progress.105 There is no
reason why promoting scientific progress cannot be done
concomitantly with the promotion of human progress. Human
development is multifaceted, and includes progress in terms of
health, education, and economic wealth. Promoting progress in this
broader sense will require intellectual property law to draw on the
various counter-regimes for guidance.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, domestic courts generally do not apply
international law.106 However, intellectual property law is an area of
law that is very much internationalized. Minimum intellectual
dissemination of ‘new’ knowledge and information underpins the legal construction
of IPRs. To this end, all IPRs encompass a balance between private rights for reward
and public needs for the (unconstrained) availability of important knowledge and
information.”).
103. Alina Ng has argued that there are other ways to conceive of
“progress.” See ALINA NG, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE
USEFUL ARTS 123 (2011) (“We have unwittingly permitted economics rather than
ethics to be the governing influence upon the behaviour of those creating, producing,
and using literary and artistic work within the copyright system. In many ways, the
progress of science and the useful arts works on a very different plane from the one
we have constructed through our laws.”).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
105. Human Development Index (HDI), UN DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (last visited Apr. 13,
2015) (“The [Human Development Index] was created to emphasize that people and
their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a
country, not economic growth alone.”).
106. This holds true even though there is a constitutional provision that states
that all treaties entered into by the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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property standards were established globally, and much of the
resistance to intellectual property standards is taking place at the
international level. Furthermore, the challenges posed by the
patenting of live, self-replicating technologies are not limited to a
single nation. Monsanto is a global corporation that transacts
business across borders.
The primary multilateral intellectual property agreement,
TRIPS, offers some flexibility to nations. However, TRIPS by itself
cannot provide solutions to the moral and ethical challenges some
scholars have raised. Human rights regimes and agricultural treaties
are helpful insofar as their goals are distinct from the “commodityoriented” focus of TRIPS. Yet, these agreements do not have
sufficient legal force to counteract patent law where necessary.
Nonetheless, we might draw on agreements like the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, and human rights instruments
for guidance in shaping intellectual property law to give greater
weight, in some instances, to interests that may be contrary to those
of the patent owner.
Guided by the principles from these counter-regimes, patent
law can be developed so that it promotes progress, more broadly
defined, as well as innovation. Economic progress is essential, but
innovation is also about social progress and human development.107
However, intellectual property laws that are interpreted and applied
based predominantly on an economic model of progress will
continue to leave us with unsatisfactory answers to difficult
questions.

107. Human development or human progress can be measured by reference
to indices such as the United Nations Human Development Index. See supra note
105.

